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Final Report: What Have We Learned? A Practical Perspective

Robert Klitgaard

Within a few months after the CLAD's sponsored International Forum on Fight agarst Corruption, in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, June 15-16, 1998, four new presidents were sworn in from among the nineteen participating countries-Raúl Cubas in Paraguay, Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador, and Andrés Pastrana in Colombia and Hugo Chavez Frias in Venezuela. All four leaders immediately declared war on corruption. For example, in his inaugural speech on August 15 President Cubas promised.

"Frontal combate a la impunidad y rigurosa aplicación de las leyes, en particular contra quienes lucran con los recursos del Estado, privando de mayor bienestar a la comunidad toda y manchando el honor de los funcionarios públicos honestos. Y medidas ejemplificadoras para delincuentes que han demostrado premeditación, especialmente en el ámbito económico y financiero.[1] "

As we consider the various papers prepared for the CLAD Conference, an interesting question is how they might help these newly elected presidents in their wars against corruption.

A grave problem

First, how serious a problem is corruption? Many of the papers presented at the conference used flights of rhetoric: *

"un flagelo que amenaza seriamente la pervivencia y el desarrollo de nuestras democracias" (Venezuela; Chile also cited "el flagelo de la corrupción y el soborno"), *

"uno de los peores males de la sociedad moderna" (Panamá), *

"el mayor de los fantasmas que recorre el mundo en este final de siglo" (Mexico), *

"el peor enemigo del sistema democrático y libre" (Paraguay), and *

"la corrupción está en el aire que respiramos" (Mario Vargas Llosa, Latin America in general, cited by Uruguay).

The Costa Rican paper cites a Plan Nacional de Rescate de Valores, which asserts: "Todos sin excepción sabemos y sentimos que una corriente de corrupción está minando nuestra identidad, nuestras instituciones, nuestra sociedad y nuestra nacionalidad."

Cuba identified itself as an exception, where "no se manifiesta el fenómeno de la corrupción en la magnitud y complejidad que preocupa y ocupa a la mayor parte de los países, tanto desarrollados, como subdesarrollados."[2]  Just as other countries provided no data about the extent or damage of corruption, neither did Cuba substantiate its relative absence there.

Only Bolivia provided quantitative information, and these were about perceptions of the seriousness and extent of corruption. With the help of the World Bank, Bolivia has recently completed a round of public opinion surveys, wherein corruption is classed as the fifth most important social problem. Seventy-nine percent of households called corruption "grave or very grave." (Nonetheless, the Bolivian representative criticized the recent ratings of Transparency International on methodological grounds; these ratings placed Bolivia among the most corrupt countries in the world).

Where most prevalent?

Where do countries believe that corruption is most prevalent or damaging? The answers were not systematic, and in many cases the reader might infer that the problem was highly generalized. However, some countries did make statements (without supporting evidence) about sectors where corruption seems particularly pernicious.

The Colombian paper said that the principal location of corruption is in public contracts. Here it has many manifestations:

"fraccionamiento de contratos, madecuado uso de la "urgencia manifiesta," contratos con cooperativas públicas, asesorías profesionales y contratos con fiducias que se revierten en interpretaciones torcidas de la ley, de manera maligna y burda. No hay planeación en la contratación pública, los controles son insuficientes y no hay control en las unidades sobre los procesos de ejecución de los contratos, que impiden que se cumplan las condiciones de calidad."[3] 

The Panamanian paper agrees: "el blanco favorito de estos señores, lo constituyen las compras que realiza el estado y para ello se valen de un sinnúmero de actividades..." (Lynch, p. 2).

In Mexico a system of random inspections of public services led to the identification of some of them as the most likely to be corrupt. "... [L]os servicios que por sus características naturales y universo de trabajo, presentan mayores índices de corrupción: los servicios que presta la Dirección General de Seguridad Pública y Tránsito (DGSPyT), transporte público, verificación vehicular, regulación sanitaria, regulación de la tenencia de la tierra, averiguaciones previas, inspección a empresas y establecimientos" (Haro Belchez, pp. 18-19).

The report from Ecuador focuses on the administration of justice. It describes a form of systematic corruption it calls "scientific."

"En el léxico popular se empieza a conocer el fenómeno como la "corrupción científica" de la administración de justicia, porque ha dejado de ser ciega, ha olvidado la verdad procesal, y se deja conducir por razonamientos de las consecuencias de una sentencia o resolución que más satisfagan los intereses de los litigantes que ejercen presión en el juez o tribunal"[4] .

In Bolivian surveys, citizens ranked customs as the "most corrupt institution." Eighty-seven percent of respondents said that "procesos de licitación no son limpios."[5]  The Bolivian briefing document itself rated the legal system as the primary weakness in the anti-corruption effort.[6] 

What Causes Corruption?

This question seems irresistible, even though answering it often leads to what Robert Solow once called "a blaze of amateur sociology."

Many papers cited as causes too large a state, with too much power over economic activities. For example, the briefing book distributed by Venezuela's Oficina Nacional de Ética Pública names as conditions leading to "corrupción estructurada": *

Centralización del poder *

Dirigismo del comercio y la industria *

Controles excesivos *

Monopolio de la información *

Manejo de empresas

Several papers used the formula corruption = monopoly + discretion - transparency or a close relative to it.

In Colombia the causes include narcotrafficking, globalization, and a rapid program of decentralization that was not accompanied by sufficient controls.[7] 

The Guatemalan briefing was thorough-going, blaming corruption on "el contexto ético moral, económico, social, político y de la sociedad." To which it added what are perhaps the two key catalysts of corruption: "... la impunidad y ... la falta de sistemas funcionales y efectos para prevenirla." Throughout the conference papers, and indeed throughout the literature on corruption, one finds a tension between attempts at holistic causal analysis, which quickly can become superficial and unhelpful, and more operational diagnoses, such as those that emphasize impunity and weak government systems. By "frying big fish" one can rapidly change perceptions of impunity, and fortunately many examples exist of strengthened systems of procurement, tax administration, campaign financing, credit, and contracting (for example).

How to Reduce Corruption?

Here, too, many of the papers could not resist rhetorical journeys into the hypothetical long-run. Many papers asserted that a cultural change or a change in consciousness will be necessary to reduce corruption. For example, the Colombian paper asserts: "Hay que cambiar la cultura que premia el enriquecimiento ilícito, la que no sanciona" (Villegas Garzón, p. 13). In Venezuela, impunity "ha creado una especie de subcultura o anti-cultura, donde se la tolera, se la acepta y a veces hasta se la celebra" (p. 21). Venezuela's Comisionado Presidencial para la Vigilancia de la Administración Pública, a former teacher, takes as the first line of battle the country's educational system, from pre-school on (González Urdaneta, p. 17). He aims at nothing less than a "new ethical order, both national and international."

The Costa Rican presentation was by the president of the Comisión Nacional de Rescate y Formación de Valores, organized by the Colegio de Abogados but including a interdisciplinary group of professionals. Like the Venezuelan plan, it aspires to affect both formal and non-formal education at all levels, and to involve the state, communities, professional associations, businesses, cooperatives, unions, the press, and churches. Its educational programs try to go beyond "una lección propia de la filosofía especulativa, sino como una conducta cotidiana" (p. 4). With the help of the executive branch, it has created "setenta comisiones institucionales, con las cuales se trabaja hasta el interior de las organizaciones, capacitando a los servidores públicos sobre valores, la ética, la calidad, la responsibilidad, el trabajo, el respeto, la solidaridad, la criticidad [sic], la iniciativa, la creatividad, el servicio al cliente, la eficiencia y la eficacia" (p. 8). The goal is most imporantly consciousness-raising ("despertar la conciencia del empleado público").

None of the papers presented evidence that consciousness-raising works. None presented evidence that we know how to undertake cultural changes of this kind as part of public policy (even though we all acknowledge that cultural changes do occur). None showed evidence that educational programs change popular morality or behavior. There is a large leap between the assertion that education and cultural change are needed to the prescription that one or another undertaking is likely to make a measurable difference.

Thus, experience shows that the moralistic approach also leads to its disillusions. Venezuela has advanced a "Plan Nacional Compromiso Educativo Anti-Corrupción." The Venezuelan paper goes even further and calls for a national and international "nuevo orden ético," which appears by the way to consist of principles as old as civilization. At the end of the paper, the author admits that it may take decades to see any effects, and that one of the hardest parts of his job has been "mantener un sano equilibrio entre los niveles de aspiración y logros, regla sicológica válida para cualquiera que no quiera caer en estados de impotencia, decepción, frustración y aun de depresión y entrega fatalista..." (González Urdaneta, p. 36).

Codes of Ethics

A related but narrower idea is to foster better ethics through a code of conduct for government officials. Many governments have taken steps along these lines, with various degrees of ambition.

Venezuela has put forth a code of ethics with eleven guiding principles of conduct, which range from honesty through decorum, loyalty, and efficiency down to punctuality and "pulcritud" (González Urdaneta, pp. 24-26). The author calls for a new national and international ethical order, and hopes to get it through education and involving citizens in a variety of workshops.

Many other countries have promulgated a code of conduct for public servants. Guatemala, for example, has promulgated a "compromiso nacional de integridad." It commits various parts of the government to fulfill ethical and moral principles, so that Guatemal might become an "island of integrity."

Costa Rica's efforts to rescue and form values has made progress, its president writes. But his document is not na‹ve about the obstacles faced, including a lack of political will. The leaders of the government speak boldly about corruption, "sin embargo las acciones concretas distan de la retórica" (p. 18), always a problem with reforms that aim at ethical consciousness-raising. Other obstacles include "compromisos político-electorales," a lack of confidence in the judicial system, "las limitaciones para señalar y cuestionar los actos de corrupción," and a lack of incentives in the public sector. Nonetheless, the document continues to make recommendations exclusively along legal and consciousness-raising lines.[8] 

Others are skeptical of efforts to change ethics or cultures, at least through education alone. For example, one of the Argentinian papers ("Transparencia y Tecnologías de Gestión") postulates that transparency "no puede hacerse depender de un 'cambio cultural' que seguramente no evolucionará satisfactoriamente si no se lo impulsa y moviliza a través de un conjunto de estímulos que rompan la inercia cultural y que alteren-en el sentido desado-las relaciones causales entre las variables organizacionales de interés" (p. 36, emphasis in original). Apart from education, therefore, Argentina is attempting to implant a series of management technologies "para incrustar transparencia en la Administración" (p. 36, emphasis in original).

But the author eventually says that technical changes are not sufficient, either. Beyond technical improvements, organizational change is required, and this proves difficult for bureaucracy. Moreover, social change is also required, including a transformation of citizens' attitudes to exercise control over public administration. "En síntesis, el fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil es también un requisito para la transparencia" (p. 37). But this is the paper's last sentence; and no clue is given about how the needed transformations and strengthening might take place, indeed no clue either about what exactly the terms in italic might mean. And so one is left in a kind of limbo: not ethics, but eventually yes attitudes, but the "how" is not supplied.

Other Approaches to Reducing Corruption

A Leaner State: In many of the countries privatization has gone forward. Some people believe that this will reduce corruption. For example, the Panamanian paper describes the many examples of privatized state enterprises as a key anti-corruption step. The Bolivian and Nicaraguan contributions are two of many that cited the importance of a less distorted economy with fewer state interventions.

Democracy: Interestingly, democracy itself, though welcome for many reasons, is no panacea against corruption. The Paraguayan presentation states baldly: "Hoy, el América Latina se ha generalizado la angustia de comprobar que la democracia no solo no es inmune a la corrupción, sino que puede convivir fraternalmente con ella."[9]  Bolivia "ha logrado avances importantes en institucionalización y profundización democrática." Nonetheless: "La población no percibe avances y pierde credibilidad" because of corruption. Progress in the fight against corruption will come from a "proceso integral y gradual con liderazgo concentrado."[10] 

A Performance-oriented Government: The Bolivian government emphasized better incentives for public servants, along with better accountability, the limiting of official discretion, and a strategy of beginning with those areas most vulnerable to corruption. Public officials will also be asked to declare "bienes y rentas." Bigger penalties will be put in place for giving and receiving bribes. Bureaucratic trámites will be simplified and their steps amply publicized. These are a few steps in what seems an impressive, sytematic approach to corruption built on incentives for performance, including honesty.[11] 

Accountability

Performance cannot be rewarded if it cannot be measured. This in turn implies many forms of accountability and evaluation. Some are systematic audits of both inputs and outputs. Some are random inspections. Others involve citizen participation. Several countries have taken interesting steps forward.

For example, Mexico has an interesting program of roving, random inspections of the delivery of public services, called the "usuario itinerante." Through unannounced investigations, inspectors see how well services are being delivered. They also check on the progres of deregulation and administrative simplification. And they also "coadyuvar a la prevención, control y combate de los actos de corrupción."[12] 

Chile cites as an outstanding administrative initiative against corruption the creation of the Consejo de Auditoría Interna General de Gobierno. This has been a kind of brain trust for internal audits, preparing "documentos doctrinarios y técnicos" that guide the process throughout government.[13] 

Several countries provided detailed examples of improving internal audits. For example, in the case of its system of internal controls, research in Brazil has shown that an improved method for selecting cases for review leads to greater efficiency. The Brazilian (Falcão Pessoa) paper contains other useful ideas for improving internal control systems. The Argentinian paper "Transparencia y Tecnologías de Gestión" also contains useful ideas for improving control systems. But even here, one of the most interesting initiatives (results-based evaluation) has so far shown disappointing results (pp. 26-7). With some exceptions, however, incentive reforms didn't work well: "la conducta exhibida por el aparato burocrático parece haber tendido frecuentemente a cumplir los requisitos formales para apropiarse de los eventuales incentivos, sin modificar significativamente las actitudes, las conductas y los desempeños sustanciales" (p. 27, emphasis in original).

El Salvador describes several structural reforms that seem to the author promising. In 1993 a high-level commission named by the President examined corruption in public administration. Its findings encouraged remedial actions. Civil society has grown more vocal in its opposition to corruption, as has the press. A combined public-private-NGO group called el Grupo Lima has tried to raise consciousness against corruption across political and institutional boundaries. In the judicial branch an Oficina de Probidad has the task of preventing corruption there. La Corte de Cuentas has new programs that encourage popular participation against corruption. Several new laws have clarified penalties, moved against money laundering, and tried to make privatization less subject to corruption. A project to strengthen municipal administration includes an effort to promote both efficiency and honesty.[14] 

Many countries would be interested to learn more about Mexico's program of "contraloría social." Beginning in 1991 and fortified in 1995, civic committees are now in place reviewing the progress of public projects and programs. From 1995 to 1998 over eight thousand Comités Ciudadanos de Control y Vigilancia have been established. They review all public works carried out with state or federal funds in all 122 municipalities of the Estado de México. Their scope has expanded to include fertilizer subsidies, irrigation canal maintenance, electrification, and school equipment. These committees had an interesting unforeseen benefit. In the 1996 local elections, 244 of the candidates, from diverse parties, had been "contralores sociales."[15]  It is not clear how the results of contraloría social are linked with improved incentives (including penalties, if necessary) for public servants and citizens.

Uruguay has passed a law that allows ample public participation. "...[L]a participación ciudadana es una de las mejores armas para combatir la corrupción, nuestra ley incorpora distintas herramientas que permiten a la ciudadanía participar en la lucha generando instancias de control social."[16]  The details remain vague.

There are a variety of ways to encourage the public to denounce acts of corruption. In Venezuela an agreement with the postal service has led to "buzones anti-corrupción." Citizens "pueden acudir a la oficina postal más cercana a su centro de trabajo o domicilio para realizar denuncias sobre hechos de corrupción" (González Urdaneta, p. 27).[17]  Unfortunately, experience in other countries shows that often the denuncias are false, even mischievous or slanderous. A key question is: What does a government do once it has received many denuncias of many kinds and from many sources?

Panama has created a new office to receive public complaints of corruption. it has also created a public-private "Diálogo Nacional para la Participación Ciudadana en la Lucha Contra la Corrupción." Supported by the United Nations, this initiative involves la Procuraduría General de la Nación, la Procuraduría de la Administración, la Contraloría, and the Panamanian chapter of Transparency International (a non-governmental organization). The technical advisers for this effort are from the Venezuelan NGO Pro Calidad de Vida. The Diálogo promotes seminars and courses in both the public and private sectors, and it carries out surveys of citizens' perceptions of corruption.

Some Impressive National Strategies

The Dominican Republic has a relatively new national strategy against corruption, which has (as my introductory paper says) many exemplary features. In addition to the Dominican presentation, a recent book was distributed, which describes in persuasive detail the country's incipient strategy.[18]  The Nicaraguan paper presented another impressive strategy, which like the Bolivian effort is in a somewhat earlier stage of implementation.

The Colombian paper describes a strategy that appears exemplary, that of the administration of the now-former President Samper. It included: *

A national plan against corruption (Plan Transparencia "Para Volver a Creer") *

Legal reforms, including an anti-corruption statute. *

A code of ethics for public servants *

Citizen oversight *

Involving business in self-regulation *

Declaration of wealth by public servants, including a Sistema para el Control y Seguimiento de la Declaración de Bienes y Rentas de los Servidores Públicos *

An emphasis on government by results *

Other administrative reforms, including simplification, a "data bank" of success stories, and "precios testigo."

"These are excellent strategies but for the most part they are still strategies on paper," was the comment of one participant at the conference. Another way to say this is that we are not yet sure that these strategies will be implemented or if implemented how well they will work. I am impressed by the ideas and actions taken so far in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Bolivia. They emphasize prevention, they take information seriously and practically, they worry about incentives, they prioritize. But they have not been in place long enough to judge their effectiveness. Except perhaps for Colombia's case, and here the pudding does not seem to be universally palatable.

In Colombia despite the admirable strategy of the Samper government, described in the paper for this conference and in othe documents, corruption was still a major issue in the 1998 presidential campaign. The Colombian paper is rightly proud of many positive steps taken. And yet even here there is also pessimism. "Ha faltado, debe reconocerse, aplicación de la ley; el Gobierno debe reconocer su responsibilidad al respecto, como lo viene haciendo." In 1998 a Presidential Directive searched for solutions to the "incumplimiento de los instrumentos normativos vigentes." A pilot project is underway in the department of Quindío, focusing on implementation. More generally, "se presenta, hay que reconocerlo, incapacidad técnica para poner en ejecución las investigaciones disciplinarias ante la ausencia de tradición administrativa y subsiguientes dificultades interpretativas." Particularly discouraging is this statement: "Cuando se han detectado las causas y no se ha hecho nada, lo que termina prevaleciendo es la tolerancia de los ciudadanos, actitud que significa complicidad."[19] 

Conclusions

The participants in this conference, and I believe their governments, no longer wish to be complicit with corruption. Their outrage sometimes understandably boils into exhortation and preaching, into calls for new ethical norms or the recapture of old ones-in the wonderful expression of the Costa Rican commission, "el rescate y la formación de valores." As it happens, for years Latin Americans have been good at exhortation and preaching, at expressing and debating alternative holistic visions of cultural degradation and improvement; and yet though it is painful to admit, this has led to little progress against problems such as corruption. In any case, the rhetoric is now fairly universal, and the task is now to learn about the practical steps that can be taken to reduce impunity, strengthen institutions, enhance accountability without creating excessive costs and red tape, and creating better incentives for serving the public and controlling corruption.

I believe that had the newly elected presidents of Paraguay, Ecuador, and Colombia and Venezuela been able to attend this forum, they would have appreciated the many presentations and discussions, only some of which could be included in this publication. But they also would have chided the participants to do better, to be more practical and less rhetorical, and to learn from what works elsewhere.

We have seen that a large number of interesting initiatives are underway, with however little in the way of case studies or systematic evaluation. Can we accelerate our learning from each other by continuing not only to share information, but by fostering regional efforts to carry out the case studies and the evaluations?

Several practical recommendations emerged from the Foro. The most concrete was the creation of a "red anti-corrupción" using the technology of the Internet. The idea is to create a site that would enable the forum's participants to continue to interact. But much more than that: the site would be an active recruiter of institutions and individuals who are interested in the fight against corruption. Some participants would be government officials. Others would be scholars, activists, business people, and ordinary citizens. The site would be managed at CLAD[20] .

Another idea involves an even more practical, hands-on learning experience, where participants from around the region would share their incipient anti-corruption activities and help each other move to the next steps. Case studies might be shared, indeed developed anew. There was interest in a municipal version of such practical programs, where city officials could examine best practice and work together in developing anti-corruption strategies that work.

A third idea is to undertake more rigorous evaluations of both problems and solutions. Colombia now has a number of fascinating studies underway of the effects of corrupt systems and of various ways of making such systems less corrupt. It would be fascinating to study the benefits and costs of the Mexican idea of social accountability, of the initiatives in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, of the various codes of conduct and moralization efforts underway in the region. Without careful, independent evaluation, we are too often left with undocumented assertion, which carries little weight or persuasive power in a political context.

So, it is hoped that the forum will be followed by the creation of a "red anti-corrupción," by a number of practical workshops on anti-corruption strategies, and by careful case studies and evaluations of the many initiatives now underway in the region. With such steps, we can hope that in four or five years, when another round of new Latin American presidents is sworn in, we will know much more about the kinds of initiatives that the presidents might consider when they, too, declare war on corruption.

 

 

NOTAS

[1]  "A bogged down economy with uncontrollable disorders in the financial sector; an unstable political situation with problems only precariously resolved; an impoverished citizenry, whose organized sectors mobilized themselves only for sterile revenges; unchecked corruption that has caused losses in the millions; basic services that are every day more deficient. Wasmosy departs from the government leaving a worse country than he encountered." La Nación, Asunción, August 15, 1998, from the Internet; my translation. Return to Text

[2]  "La Corrupción y la Experiencia Cubana," p. 2. The Portuguese paper also said that corruption was not a serious problem (Catarino, pp. 9-11). Text

[3]  Villegas Garzón, p. 13. Text

[4]  Luis Hidalgo López, Administración de Justicia. Serie Estrategias para Combatir la Corrupción en el Ecuador. Quito: Asociación Nacional de Empresarios, 1998, p. 7. Text

[5]  "Institucionalidad: Plan Nacional de Integridad. Estrategia Boliviana de Desarrollo Institucional y Lucha contra la Corrupción," briefing notes, p. 2. Text

[6]  "No hay estado de derecho, debilidad institucional, poder judicial partidzado," "Institucionalidad...", p. 3. Text

[7]  "Otro aspecto constitucional relevante radicó en el cambio de régimen hacia una descentralización precipitada del sector central al territorial, que produjo un masivo traslado de recursos, decisión que no se acompañó de controles, de formas de veeduría que hubieran evitado la apropiación de lo que se consideró como un botín" (Villegas Garzón, p. 3, emphasis in original). Text

[8]  Vega Miranda, esp. pp. 18-21. Text

[9]  Fretes Ventre, p. 6. Text

[10]  "Institucionalidad," p. 7. Text

[11]  "Institucionalidad..." p.6. Text

[12]  Haro Belchez, pp. 17ff. See also the large briefing book distributed by the Secretaría de la Contraloría. Text

[13]  "Acciones para el Fortalecimiento de la Probidad y La Ética Pública: La Experiencia Chilena," pp. 3-4. Text

[14]  "Esfuerzos para Combatir la Corrupción: Caso El Salvador," pp. 2-5. Text

[15]  Haro Belchez, pp. 15ff. Text

[16]  Manini Ríos, pp. 8-9. Text

[17]  It is not clear why special, local places to post the denuncias is necessary (why not through regular mail?). And as the author goes on to say, without irony, "Esto supone que, tramitada la misma, es posible prevenir la continuidad lacerante del hecho corrupto y formar conciencia intolerante hacia este tipo de actuación" (González Urdaneta, p. 27). Text

[18]  La Lucha contra la Corrupción en la República Dominicana. Documentos de la Conferencia Nacional hacia un Plan Estratégico de Prevención de la Corrupción. Santo Domingo: Procuraduría de la República, 1998. Text

[19]  Villegas Garzón, pp. 12, 8, 7, 13. Text

[20]  In compliance with this resolution, CLAD created the "Network of Institutions for the Fight Against Corruption and the Rescue of Public Ethics" (RICOREP) currently made up by 45 institutions from Latin America and Europe, and individuals related with the academic study of this field. These institutions and individuals are engaged in an active exchange of communications, documents and experiences on these topics through and electronic bulletin and a page at CLAD's website. RICOREP is also developing some projects oriented to potentiate reciprocal knowledge on these subjects and aspires that aditional institutions and individuals will join the network. Text

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